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NoTEs AN CoMMENTs
legislation to remain applicable to interstate traders, is whether or not
there might be a commensurate lessening of interstate trade-whether
or not interstate commerce is put at a disadvantage in fact. And this
test can be applied appropriately to those penumbra situations falling
between solicitors and peddlers, especially photographers, noted here-
in. It is believed that municipal occupational license fees on photog-
raphers, even if they do not discriminate expressly against itinerants,
do operate to cut down on the volume of the interstate photography.
commerce. 43 The cumulative effect is just as bad for the photogra-
pher as it is for his pre-touring solicitor. If the tax is permitted to be
levied against the cameraman so that he is effectively barred from fol-
lowing the protected solicitor, then what practical gain in the protec-
tion of interstate commerce can be achieved by immunizing the so-
licitor? As pointed out in the Forrest City decision, the taking of the
picture is the central feature of this particular interstate business, and
without the photographer and his camera there can not even be a
product for interstate commerce to handle. It is therefore submitted
that municipal occupational taxes upon such photographers are un-
constitutional, being violative of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.44
CHARLEs RicaRD DoYLE
See RorrsCaA-FFMr, supra note 6 at 346; "A business consisting wholly in
the performance of services that are an indispensable part thereof is equally im-
mune to such taxation."
"The municipalities do have some recourse against such "nuisances." See,
for example, Breard v. Alexandria, supra note 2 at 637: "... a permissible burden
on commerce." [To require prior consent of owners of residences to be solicited]
at 638: ". . . but regulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the same basis as
local sellers cannot be invalid for that reason." 50 MicH. L. REv. 150 (1951); 35
MARQ. L. REv. 198 (1951); 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233, 257, 262, suggesting Con-
gressional legislation; 5 FLA. L. REv. 196 (1952).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
WHAT ARE "PRINCIPAL CONTRACTORS"?
A confusing area in the law of workmen's compensation has de-
veloped in connection with the term "principal contractor." The term
appears in provisions of workmen's compensation acts designed at
making a "principal contractor" the statutory employer of the employee
of his subcontractors.1 Mr. Schneider, in his Workmen's Compensa-
tion Text states that:
I See 2 ScmmNEE, WoRmxE's COMPENSATION TEXT 176 (1942) (where he
states that all but seven states have statutes which constitute the principal con-
tractor the statutory employer of the employees of the subcontractor, although in
fact he may not be the actual employer of the injured employee); 71 C.J. 483
(1935); 58 Ai. JuR. 672 (1948).
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The apparent legislative purpose of constituting the principal con-
tractor a statutory employer is to prevent evasion of the act; to
protect the employees of subcontractors who are not finacially re-
sponsible; to induce all employers to carry insurance; or to make the
principal contractor a guarantor of the personal injury obligations of
the subcontractor.
2
It is thus evident that one of the main purposes of the workmen's
compensation acts is to prevent employers from relieving themselves
of liability under the acts by doing through independent contractors
what they would ordinarily do directly through employees. 3 However,
the courts are not in complete agreement with regard to the scope of
the term "principal contractor." It has been particularly a problem in
those situations where an owner, instead of using his own employees,
hires an independent contractor to do a portion of his work on a
particular undertaking.4 The problem is further complicated when the
owner furnishes part of the labor and/or materials on the job. For
example, suppose a large company hires an independent contractor to
build some structure on the premises of the company or to perform
some process necessary to the company's business. Will the company
be liable as a principal contractor to employees of the independent
contractor for workmen's compensation? Much may depend on the
wording of statutes which vary according to purposes to be accom-
plished and according to the classes of employers or owners sought to
be held liable by the legislatures.5
The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Statute seems to be a
typical example of a statute using the term "principal contractor,"
and when its wording is compared with other statutes in which this
term is used and/or has been applied, the variety in the acts is demon-
strated. 6 Kentucky Revised Statute 342.060 (Liability of Contractor
and Subcontractor) provides:
'SCHNEIDER, WOn!CEN'S COMPENSATION TExT 175 (1942).
'58 AM. Jum. 673 (1948).4Buckhorn Coal and Lumber Co. v. Georgia Casualty Co., 222 Ky. 683, 2
S.W. 2d 383 (1928); Brooks v. Buckley and Banks, 291 Pa. 1, 139 Atl. 379
(1927); Siskin v. Johnson, 151 Tenn. 93, 268 S.W. 630 (1925). Contra: Phoenix
Indemnity Co. v. Barton Torpedo Co., 137 Kan. 92, 19 P. 2d 739 (1933).
'Some statutes are designed to make a "principal contractor" or "principal
employer" primarily liable and others to make such a person secondarily liable to
employees of independent contractors. Liability may also be conditioned on
whether an injured employee of an independent contractor was engaged upon
an undertaking that was part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation. 'To
hold the principal liable for compensation, even though the sub-contractor carries
insurance, would mean giving the employees of the sub-contractor a greater right
than the employees of the principal, for they would have a right against their
immediate employer, the sub-contractor, as well as the principal." 2 ScnNEai,
WoRKVMN'S COMPE-NSATION TExT 177 (1942).
'See SCHNEImER, WoxM~EN'S COMIPENSAriON T=xxr (1942) for provisions of
Workmen's Compensation Statutes by states.
NoTES AND Com =nTS
A principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable
for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any
one of his intermediate or subcontractors and engaged upon the sub-
ject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate
employer.
7
An indication of the meaning of "principal contractor" may be
found in Buckhorn Coal and Lumber Co. v. Georgia Casualty Co.,"
in which a company engaged in cutting and preparing timber for
market was held not to be a "contractor" or "principal contractor"
within the Kentucky statute. The Buckhorn Coal and Lumber Co.
owned large areas of timber land from which it was having the timber
cut and prepared for market. It contracted with third parties to float
products by water to certain places of delivery. The court held that
under these contracts the third parties became independent contrac-
tors, and accordingly their wages could not be taken into account in
estimating the amount of premium under the insurance contract re-
quired by the compensation statute. The court said, "The conclusive
feature of this branch of the case is the fact that the insured was prose-
cuting the business or undertaking ...for itself, and not as a con-
tractor."D
The court by way of illustration stated that if A, who owns a lot
and desires to build a house on it, engages in the undertaking him-
self, buys his own material, and employs his own laborers, he would
not be a contractor and would not come under the terms of the com-
pensation act. "Consequently, if while so building his house he con-
tracts with another under such circumstances that the other becomes
an independent contractor to do the plastering or the brick work, the
other is not his subcontractor within the section, supra, of the Com-
pensation Act, and the employees of the latter are not employees of
the former."'0 The court thus seems to be saying that one who is con-
'Ky. Itv. STAT. 342.060 (1953) continues to the effect that any principal
intermediate or subcontractor who pays compensation under the section may
recover the amount paid from any subordinate contractor through whom he has
been rendered liable. The section makes the principal contractor only secondarily
liable because it further provides that claims for compensation must first be in-
stituted against the immediate employer.
8222 Ky. 683, 2 S.W. 2d 383 (1928).
OId. at 690, 2 S.W. 2d at 386.
" Ibid. See also, Staton v. Reynolds Metals Co., 58 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Ky.
1945) (in which the Reynolds Metals Company was held to be a principal con-
tractor when it was employed by the Defense Plant Corporation to perform con-
struction work according to plans with a provision that subcontractors could be
employed by the company, even though the company received no direct compensa-
tion in cash); Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 622, 145 S.W. 2d 537,
541 (1940) (in which the court said ...... the general rule regarding the liability
of the owner of property as to injuries and damages resulting from the acts of an
independent contractor is that such owner is not liable unless the work to be done
by the independent contractor is in itself a nuisance or unless the work of the
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sidered an "owner" cannot be held liable as a "contractor."
This question was directly raised in the Tennessee case of Siskin v.
Johnson"- under a provision of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensa-
tion Statute almost identical in wording with that in the Kentucky
statute. The Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 12,
Acts of 1919, states:
A principal, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for com-
pensation to any employe injured while in the employ of any of his
subcontractors and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract
to the same extent as the immediate employer.12
In the Siskin case the defendants employed an independent con-
tractor to unload and transfer car wheels to a certain place, and an
attempt was made to hold the defendants liable for compensation to
the independent contractor's employee who was injured while un-
loading the wheels. The court took the position that the section was
not intended to apply to an owner or person having work done for
his own benefit by means of a contract with an independent con-
tractor, but only to independent contractors, or subcontractors there-
under.13 This interpretation is in accord with the plain meaning of the
terms of the statutory provision and seems to be what is the better
and the majority view on the question of interpretation of "principal
contractor" as used in such statutory provisions.14 Since the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has indicated that a "principal contractor," or
any type of contractor, within the subcontracting section of the Work-
men's Compensation Act must be one who contracts to carry out work
for another, it is submitted that it would adhere to the interpretation
of "principal contractor" set forth in Siskin v. Johnson and other similar
cases.
A leading case which takes an opposite view on the question of
instrumentality for doing it is inherently dangerous."); Raponi v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 224 Ky. 167, 5 S.W. 2d 1043 (1928) (in which laborers engaged to
work for a person contracting with a coal company to excavate a slate dump were
held to be employees of an independent contractor and not of the coal company
even though the employees signed the compensation register of the coal com-
pany and were paid by it for their services).
"151 Tenn. 93, 268 S.W. 630 (1925).
"Like the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act, the Tennessee act pro-
vides that every claim for compensation must first be instituted against the im-
mediate employer.
' See note, 58 A.L.R. 880 (1929).
14 Supra, note 4. For other cases defining and explaining "principal con-
tractor" and indicating that such a person is not one who has work done for him-
self see generally: Jennings v. Vincent's Adm'x, 284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W. 2d 537
(1940); Eutsler v. Huff, 222 Ky. 48, 299 S.W. 1070 (1927); Lutz v. Long Bell
Lumber Sales Corp., La. App., 153 So. 319 (1934); Priby v. Lee, 15 N.J. Misc.
292, 191 Atl. 105 (1936); Davis v. City of Philadefphia, 153 Pa. Super. 645, 35
A. 2d 77 (1943); McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 153 Atl. 424
(1930); Bomber v. City of Norfolk, 138 Va. 26, 121 S.E. 564 (1924).
NoTEs AND ConvfENTs
whether one having work done for his own benefit by means of a
contract with an independent contractor can be liable as a "principal
contractor" to an injured employee of the independent contractor is
Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Barton Torpedo Co.15 The Kansas Work-
men's Compensation Statute involved in the Phoenix Indemnity Co.
case provides:
Subcontracting. (a) Where any person (in this section referred to as
principal) undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade
or business or which he has contracted to perform and contracts with
any other person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for the
execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the
work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay
to any workman employed in the execution of the work any com-
pensation under this act which he would have been liable to pay if
that workman had been immediately employed by him; ... 16
In this statute no mention is made of the term "principal con-
tractor" until section (e) in which it is said, "A principal contractor,
when sued by a workman of a subcontractor, shall have the right to
implead the contractor." It is possible, therefore, that such a "prin-
cipal" as the one described in subsection (a) can also be referred to
as a "principal contractor." This haphazard use of terms in the statute
itself is unfortunate because one can be a principal who is liable
within the terms of the statute without being one who is commonly
designated a contractor (whether principal or otherwise).
In the Phoenix case a petroleum company contracted with an
individual to drill an oil well and agreed to furnish him with the
drilling rig, casing, and other equipment. It reserved the right to take
full charge of the well and the operations thereat and to manage and
control the drilling into, shooting, and testing of oil bearing sand
reached by the driller. The company required the driller to procure
an insurance contract under the Workmen's Compensation Law to
protect it against any right of action by an employee of the driller. The
Kansas court held that the petroleum company was a "principal con-
tractor" liable for compensation for the death of an employee of the
driller. The court unfortunately stated that the petroleum company,
by reserving to itself such rights and privileges as it did, made itself
"more nearly in line with the definition of a principal contractor as
defined in the first paragraph of the section above cited, than an
owner, as it is regularly denominated in the contract."17 (writer's
italics).
It seems unfortunate that the court assumed that "principal con-
137 Kan. 92, 19 P. 2d 739 (1933).
KAN. STAT. G.S. 1949, 44-503 (taken from R.S. 1923, sec. 44-503).
17 Supra, note 15 at 740.
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tractor" is defined in paragraph (a) of the statute because only the
term "principal," a term which is broader and not necessarily inclusive
of "contractor," is there defined. The court could simply have recog-
nized the liability of the company as a "principar on the theory that
the statute, by its terms, indicates an intent to reach "owners" as well
as "contractors." Therefore, this cannot be considered, in the light of
the wording of the Kansas statute, as persuasive in the interpretation
of the position of an owner-principal contractor under statutes such
as in Kentucky and Tennessee. Just what a "principal contractor" is
does not appear clearly from the wording of paragraph (a) of the
Kansas statute, which refers both to "principal" and "contractors" but
which does not combine the two terms.
The Kansas court no doubt reached the right result under the
statute in the Phoenix case in spite of faulty reasoning, because the
petroleum company had almost complete control over the work of
the so-called contractor (who seemed to be in reality an employee)
and the company was thus a "principal" as defined by the statute.18
In the Tennessee case referred to above, the defendants supplied
and paid a workman to assist the independent contractor, but the
work was under the control and direction of the independent con-
tractor.
The decisions in which the term "principal contractor" has been
applied in various jurisdictions seem to be in conflict with regard to
the definitions and explanations of the term. There appears, however,
to be a possibility for a reconciliation of the contrary views of the
courts when the wording of the particular statutory provisions as to
employers and the facts of cases are considered. Apparently, the
"'The reasoning of the Kansas case has not been followed. Since the Kansas
court handed down its decision in the Phoenix Indemnity case, liability of those
who contract for work, which is a part of their business or trade, to be done on
their premises, has not been based on the finding that such persons were "prin-
cipal contractors." Liability has been imposed, among other reasons, because
that work contracted for was part of the business or trade of the owner and thus
made the owner a principal "employer" under subdivision (a) of the subcon-
tractor provision of Gen. St. 1985, 44-508 a,d. See Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., 161
Kan. 888, 168 P. 2d 512 (1946) (wherein a feed company, which as part of its
business sold and delivered feed at a delivered price, that it collected from the
buyer, contracted with one not operating under the compensation act, for the
delivery of feed on a per-ton basis, and an employee of the hauler, while engaged
in delivering feed to the buyer on the buyer's premises was accidentially injured.
The feed company was held liable to the employee as a "principal employer"
under subdivision (a) of Gen. St. 1935, 44-503, a,d); Lessley v. Kansas Power
and Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 281 P. 2d 289 (1951) (wherein a public utility
which engaged in the production, sale, and transmission of electric power con-
tracted for the erection of a building on its premises and the installation of equip-
ment necessary to its business, was held liable to an injured employee of a sub-
contractor of the contractor because the employee was engaged in work that was
part of the defendant's trade or business within the meaning of the act).
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primary source of confusion and conflict is the use of "principal con-
tractor" without definition in statutes, and the careless use and inap-
propriate application of the term by the courts in seeking to carry out
the legislative purpose. The Kansas statute is open to the construction
of placing owners under liability, whereas the plain meaning of the
term "principal contractor" as found in the Kentucky and Tennessee
statutes would seem to preclude it.19
In order to thwart the efforts of owners or large companies who
are seeking to avoid liability for workmen's compensation by hiring
independent contractors to do work which is a part of their usual
business and which would ordinarily be done by the owners' or com-
panies' own employees, a separate provision could be added to the
workmen's compensation acts of Kentucky, Tennessee and other similar
acts, placing liability on such owners or employers. Missouri, Vermont,
Virginia, and New Jersey have such statutes.20 The Missouri statute
provides:
1. Any person who has work done under contract on or about his
premises which is an operation of the usual business which he there
carries on shall be deemed an employer and shall be liable under this
chapter to such contractor, his subcontractors, and their employees,
when injured or killed on or about the premises of the employer while
doing work which is in the usual course of his business. 21
The term "principal contractor" might be changed to "principal
employer" to cover such cases, but even changing the words of the
statute to principal employer is not an infallible solution to the prob-
lem because it would reach owners and attach liability to some busi-
nesses that would never do their own construction work with their own
employees. Words to condition liability on the basis of work carried
on as a part of one's trade, business, or occupation are needed in ad-
dition.
A less satisfactory means of placing liability on such employers of
" The plain meaning of the term "principal contractor" can be found by con-
sulting a dictionary, although, definitions are hard or impossible to find in statutes.
In BLAcK's LAW DicjONzA:Y, p. 397 (4th ed. 1951), it is said of "contractor," the
most important word for present consideration: "This term is strictly applicable to
any person who enters into a contract, but is commonly reserved to designate one
who, for a fixed price, undertakes to procure the performance of works on a large
scale, or the furnishing of goods in large quantities, whether for the public or a
company or individual." A contractor is ...one who in pursuit of independent
business undertakes to perform a job or piece of work, retaining in himself control
of means, method and manner of accomplishing the desired result." It has been
said that in Kentucky the true test of a contractor is "that he renders service in
the course of an independent occupation representing the will of his employer
only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accom-
plished." Kentucky Cottage Industries v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Ky.
1941).
1 Mo. REv. STAT. 287.040 (1949); 2 N.J. Rlv. STAT. 34:15-3; Vauvmor
STAT. Revision of 1947, c 353, 8079; 9 VA. CODE ANN. Tit. 65, Sec. 65-2 (1950).
'Mo. REv. STAT. 287.040 (1949).
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independent contractors would be the use of a statutory definition of
"principal contractor" that would include such owners, but this would
broaden the actual meaning of the term "contractor." A provision
which might be wise and beneficial would subject an employer to
liability for compensation to employees of any of his contractors in any
case where the employer furnishes labor and/or machinery to a con-
tractor on the basis of a presumption that, under such circumstances,
the employer of the contractor is contracting for work that he would
ordinarily do himself.
The Kentucky and Tennessee statutes as presently worded do not
contain language broad enough to cover such situations, and the mean-
ing of the term "principal contractor" should not be expanded in order
to place liability on those who are not contractors by profession. Such
expansion should come, if at all, through legislative action.
P. JoA SEAcGs
TORTS-INTERVENING NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL
ACTS AS RELIEVING A NEGLIGENT ACTOR FROM LIABILITY
Liability of a negligent actor for injury to another's person or
property may present a difficult question where an intervening inde-
pendent negligent or intentionally tortious act of some third person
is the direct or immediate cause of the injury. The problem is not one
which can be disposed of wholly in terms either of proximate cause
or of duty to the injured party. The purpose of this note is to examine
the Kentucky decisions and attempt to reconcile them by using the
tests applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and also to present
some other factors which are of prime importance in determining the
basis of liability in these cases. No attempt will be made to go out-
side the Kentucky cases except to point out certain fundamental prin-
ciples which bear on the subject, and to compare the rule in Kentucky
with the general rule in other states. For purposes of clarity and em-
phasis the subject will be covered in the following order:
1) The ordinary case where an intentionally tortious or criminal
act of a third person intervenes.
2) The ordinary case where a negligent act of a third person
intervenes.
3) Certain cases where, because of some social relationships
recognized by law, the defendant has an affirmative duty to control
the acts of the intenvening third party.
